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ABSTRACT
Research projects are primarily collaborative in nature through internal and external partnerships, but what role
does funding play in their formation? Here, we examined over 43,000 funded projects in the past three decades,
enabling us to characterise changes in the funding landscape and their impacts on the underlying collaboration
patterns. We observed rising inequality in the distribution of funding and its effect was most noticeable at the
institutional level in which the leading universities diversified their collaborations and increasingly became the
knowledge brokers. Furthermore, these universities formed a cohesive core through their close ties, and such
reliance appeared to be a key for their research success, with the elites in the core over-attracting resources but
in turn rewarding in both research breadth and depth. Our results reveal how collaboration networks undergo
previously unknown adaptive organisation in response to external driving forces, which can have far-reaching
implications for future policy.
Introduction
Higher education institutions are nationally assessed in a periodic manner across the globe, examples include the
Research Excellence Framework1 in the United Kingdom, Excellenzinitiative2 in Germany and Star Metrics3 in the
United States, and tremendous effort have been put in place in maximising research output as assessment outcomes
often have a direct financial impact on revenue.4, 5 Bibliometrics are commonly used for this kind of performance
evaluations,6–8 and the volume of grant income is generally seen as a good indicator of performance. While many
studies have examined the collaboration patterns originated from publication information;9–15 little is known about
the characteristics of project collaborations supported by research funding, which is undoubtedly a type of research
output in its own right, but also the origin of other research outputs.
The availability of funding is often subject to direct and indirect constraints arisen from internal research
strategy and different levels of policy set out by the funding bodies and ultimately the government, manifesting
into different emphasises on both the research area and mode of collaboration, and this potentially influences the
way we form a project team. We have already seen examples of adaptive changes in our collaboration practises;
for instance, research in the science and engineering sector is said to be increasingly inter-organisational.16 In
addition, there are different theories on the factors that may affect the establishment of a collaboration and how well
a research team operates. Elite universities were recognised as catalysts for facilitating large scale multi-partner
research collaborations,16 and multidisciplinary collaborations were found to have higher potential to foster research
outcomes.17 As a result, the setup of a project consortium for a grant application might require considerable strategic
planning, as who and how we collaborate can potentially impact the outcome of a bid, and we are yet to fully
understand the mechanistic for success.
In order to shed light into the relations between funding landscapes and scientific collaborations, here we
examined over 43,000 collaborative projects funded between 1985 and 2013 by the Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the government body in the United Kingdom that provides funding to
universities to undertake research and postgraduate degrees in engineering and the physical sciences, including
mathematics, chemistry, materials science, energy, information and communications technology, and innovative
manufacturing. For each year, we constructed two different types of collaboration networks in which the nodes
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are investigators and their affiliations respectively, and an edge represents a funded project partnership between
two nodes. We applied a novel network-based approach to analyse the local and global interlinkage in these
networks; the former was performed by calculating the effective size18, 19 of individual nodes, which gauges the
connectivity in the neighbourhood of a node. As for the global level, we calculated the rich-club coefficient20, 21 of
the network and characterised the members of such core structure using a novel profile technique.22 In addition, we
explored how these patterns evolved over time with the availability of funding and how they correlated with research
performance.23–25 Our results allow us to gain an insight into how changes in the funding landscape shaped the way
we form research partnerships, providing a case study that is highly reflective of other countries in the European
Union and possibly other developed countries world wide.
Results
Changes in the funding landscape
During the period of study we found that the overall funding increased steadily over time, until it peaked in 2009
(Fig. 1a). The number of grants fluctuated over time with a general decline after 2001 (Fig. 1b) and, in essence,
there was an obvious trend of fewer grants but of much larger monetary values (Fig. 1c). This coincided with the
emergence of larger research teams (see Supplementary Fig. S1 online) and the timing of this tied in with the
EPSRC’s initiative on developing larger specialist units in the UK, such as establishing Doctoral Training Centres
in selected universities.26 Investigators associated with a grant were classified into Principal Investigators (PIs),
Co-Investigators (CIs) and Other Investigators (OIs). There were a total of 13,275 PIs from 201 different affiliations
(out of a total of 1834), and the average number of grants per PI was 3.25. About half of the grants were associated
with one or more CIs and/or OIs, and there was a noticeable rise in the average numbers of investigators since 2000,
which is in line with the observed increase in the typical number of collaborators in scientific publications.10, 27
Though, we did not observe the same degree of widening participation in affiliations as the average number of
affiliations associated to a grant only marginally increased (see Supplementary Fig. S1 online).
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Figure 1. The funding landscape over the last three decades. (a). The total amount of funding awarded by
EPSRC showed a general tendency to increase, with a peak in 2009, and then a decrease. Actual refers to the actual
value on record while adjusted refers to the value after the adjustment made with reference to the Consumer Prices
Index. (b). The total number of grants awarded by EPSRC peaked in 2001. (c). The average amount of funding per
grant continued to rise over time. (d). Overall distribution of funding among PIs and affiliations. Individual
awardees (PIs or affiliations) were sorted in descending order of their total funding, and the percentage of funding
was plotted against the corresponding percentage of awardees. The dotted line denotes where true equality lies and
both cases showed strong inequality. (e). Distribution of funding consistently showed a high degree of inequality
over time, in both cases of PIs and affiliations.
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The way in which funding has been awarded was highly skewed, as we found that in both cases of PIs and
affiliations about half of the available funding was awarded to the top 8% (Fig. 1d); though the distribution of
funding among the remaining PIs showed a much greater homogeneity. On the contrary, we observed over 90%
of all the funding was awarded just to the top 20% of the affiliations, suggesting a high level of focussed funding
in selected places. Furthermore, we referred to the Gini coefficient28 in order to measure how the distribution of
funding over a population deviates from a perfectly uniform distribution, with values G = 0 and G = 1 denoting
maximum equality and inequality respectively. Overall, we observed substantial inequality in both cases of PIs and
affiliations of PIs. By examining the Gini coefficient over time, we found that the level of inequality intensified as
the coefficient became closer to 1 (Fig. 1e), and this was particularly the case among the affiliations.
Network brokerage
We examined the two constructed collaboration networks in which nodes are investigators and affiliations, re-
spectively, and an edge represents a funded partnership between two nodes, and found that network properties
evolved over time depending on the total available funding (see Supplementary Fig. S2 and Fig. S3 online). The
investigator network appeared to be sparsely connected and consisted of a large number of disjoint parts, which
means that collaborations were largely localised to small groups of investigators. In contrast, the affiliation network
was found to be well connected with a definitive giant component. To further examine this noticeable level of
interconnectedness in the affiliation network, we examined the extent of local cohesion between affiliations and
their partners in the form of brokerage;18, 19 a broker is said to occupy an advantageous location in the network for
detecting and developing opportunities through their connections to non-overlapping clusters. This was performed
by computing the normalised effective size ζi of the neighbourhood of each affiliation i in the collaboration network.
Such a quantity ranges from 0 to 1. It takes its smallest value when i is part of a clique (i.e. a fully cohesive structure),
while it is equal to 1 when i is the centre of a star, and there is no link between any of its partners. Generally, the
larger the value of ζi, the less connected the neighbourhood of i is, and consequently, the higher the brokerage
opportunities of affiliation i. Overall, we found that the effective size of affiliations increases with the total funding
(Fig. 2a), with the top-funded universities occupying brokerage positions between otherwise disconnected affiliations,
potentially playing a key role in developing new access to information and opportunities.
In order to gain a better insight into the factors that may contribute towards success in terms of awarded grants,
we examined how the brokerage behaviour of the leading affiliations has changed with the total funding over the last
three decades. We found that the rise in the volume of the total funding, which coincided with the emergence of
investment on focussed research, has resulted in further centralisation of the local networks of the top 10 funded
affiliations, as reflected by the increase of ζ with funding. This is clearly shown in the case of Imperial College
(Fig. 2b), as it increasingly acted as information brokers between otherwise unconnected neighbours (Fig. 2c);
most likely thanks to their ability in facilitating new research partnerships.29 On the contrary, the lesser funded
affiliations were found to exhibit the opposite trend, as shown in the case of Heriot-Watt University (Fig. 2b); as their
ζ decreased with the volume of funding, mainly due to the rise of (about 24%) interconnecting neighbours (Fig. 2d).
Overall, we also observed a higher level of interconnectedness among the neighbours of Heriot-Watt University.
The two different collaboration strategies we observed in response to changes in funding policy appeared to be both
effective ways in securing research grants as, among the well funded affiliations we examined, both the top 10 and
those less funded, have directly benefited from their respective strategy as their awarded sums continued to rise with
the available funds (Fig. 2e and Supplementary Fig. S4 online).
The rich core of leading universities
We examined the level of global interconnectedness among the leading PIs and affiliations, which correspond to the
nodes with the largest degree, the so-called hubs, by investigating the presence of a rich-club phenomenon in the
networks.20, 21 In order to do so, we evaluated the number of edges E(k) among the N(k) nodes of degree larger than
a given value k, and we computed the rich-club coefficient, φnorm(k), normalised with respect to the case of random
graphs with the same node degrees as in the original networks. A value φnorm(k) > 1 for large k is an indication
that the hubs of a network have organised into a rich club. Indeed, we observed this phenomenon in the affiliation
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Figure 2. The brokers of the affiliation network. (a). The level of brokerage, as measured by the yearly average
effective size ζ , is reported for the 50 top-funded affiliations ranked in descending order of their total funding. (b).
The level of brokerage of Imperial and Heriot-Watt exhibited opposites trends with the rise of funding. (c).
Connectivity between Imperial College and its partners when the total sum was £250 million and over £1000 million
as indicated. Both non-connecting and inter-connecting neighbours of Imperial College are shown. (d). Same as (c)
but for Heriot-Watt University and its partners. (e). Funding obtained by Imperial and Heriot-Watt continued to rise
linearly with the total funding available.
network, but not in the case of investigators (Fig. 3a). This suggests that the affiliations with a high number of grants
tended preferentially to collaborate among each others, forming tightly interconnected communities, more than we
would expect in a random case.
We applied a core profiling method22 to extract members of the rich club for each of the 28 years and obtained
a total of 45 affiliations (see Supplementary Table S1 online). Imperial College and University of Oxford were
among those in the so-called rich core during the entire period of study, closely followed by other frequently found
members which were only absent during the early years and have remained in the rich core ever since. Figure 3b
shows the rich core in 2010, which was comprised of predominantly the leading affiliations. In particular, the top
funded affiliations were not only well connected with the rest of the core, but also showed strong interlinkages
among themselves.
We also found that the relative size of the rich core decreased gradually over time (Fig. 3c). The rich core
initially contained over 25% of the affiliations and the rise in focussed funding since the start of the millennium has
caused the rich core to further shrink and to be maintained to a relatively small size since (4-8%), and this agrees
with existing theory that stress in a system is often manifested in a reduction in core size.30, 31 The emergence in
focussed funding, however, has fostered higher interlinkage among the affiliations in the rich core, as the density
of links was initially found to be low and gradually increased during the same period. The density was found
to be the highest when the rich core was the smallest. The presence of a rich core of the leading affiliations is
a reflection of close collaborations among their researchers, and the increased level of interlinkage among these
affiliations demonstrates a tendency for their researchers to collaborate with their peers in comparably reputable
places, suggesting homophily32, 33 with respect to affiliation excellence accounts for one of the driving forces of
scientific collaborations.
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Figure 3. Elitism in scientific collaborations. (a). The affiliation network exhibited a rich-club phenomenon,
with φnorm(k)> 1 for high degree nodes, while such a behaviour was not present in the PI network (the year 2010 is
shown; other years give the same results). (b). The rich core for year 2010 showing the cohesive community formed
by the high degree nodes. Each edge is weighted by the frequency of the partnerships found in that year. (c). The
relative size of the rich core of the affiliation network, in general, shrank over time while the density of partnerships
among the affiliations in the rich core continued to rise.
Research performance
Could being in the rich-core a key towards success in research? We investigated in terms of inputs versus outputs of
its member affiliations by examining the amount of funding they received and their overall research performance.8, 16
Firstly, we found that the awarded sum of an affiliation over the 28 years linearly correlated with the number of times,
Ncore, the affiliation was present in the rich core (Fig. 4a and Supplementary Fig. S5 online), with the exception of
Imperial College, University of Cambridge and University of Manchester which have accumulated funding beyond
what is expected from a linear behaviour between Ncore and total fundings. In addition, we referred to the number of
research areas of an affiliation as a measure of the breadth of its research, and we observed this quantity generally
declines as Ncore decreases.
We also considered the relative citation score23 and the h-index24, 25 of each affiliation to capture the quantity
and the depth of research respectively; the former gauges the volume of citations among researchers in an affiliation,
and the latter additionally captures quality. We found that the citation score increased linearly with Ncore (Fig. 4b).
The absence of an obvious deviation from the average trend here suggests the capital requirement on developing
a full breadth of research areas is nontrivial; while the top 3 affiliations appeared to have successfully done so by
scoring in all areas, they did not receive citations exceedingly. As for the h-index, again we observed that Imperial
College, University of Cambridge and University of Manchester outperformed the rest of the universities in this
metric, showing a marked deviation from the linear behaviour (Fig. 4c) in all similar to that observed in the awarded
sum. Their outstanding funding profiles appeared to have enabled them to develop the depth of research which has
led to the generation of high quality papers; and University of Cambridge was particularly the case with the highest
average h-index.
Discussion
There is today an open question on the kind of collaboration mechanics that underpin success in science, and up
to now, such an issue has been mainly explored by characterising the structural patterns of collaborations based
on how scientists publish together.9–11 Our approach complements those studies based on coauthorship networks,
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Figure 4. Fundings and research performance of the rich core. (a). The total funding received by each
university over the entire 28 years is plotted as a function of the number of times an affiliation was found in the rich
core, Ncore. Node size is proportional to the total funding of the affiliation, while the colour denotes the number of
active research areas which have received a score. Dark and light blue lines denote the mean and one standard
deviation from the mean respectively. (b). The citation scores of the most frequently found affiliations increased with
their appearance in the rich core. (c). Similarly, the appearance in the core is indicative of an affiliation’s h-index.
addressing the question by looking at how scientists collaborate in order to obtain fundings for their research.
Our results demonstrate that there has been a striking change in the funding landscape in the UK in the last three
decades, with the largest engineering and physical sciences funding agency providing focused research investment
to selected places. This has also shaped the anatomy of collaborations among investigators and among universities
in terms of both the local cohesiveness and global interlinkage among them. In particular, the network analysis of
successful project partnerships among affiliations has shown that elite universities have been able to capitalise on
this competitive and rapidly changing environment; as they have become extensively the brokers of the network,
orchestrating partnerships through a diverse source. This is likely to have arisen due to their ability to develop a
broad range of expertise and extend partnerships with specialist entities.29 In addition to that, elite universities
formed the very centre of a rich core through their strong reliance.
Indeed, our findings show the presence of an elite group of affiliations over-attracting resources, and many in
the research community would find such inequality in funding distribution highly controversial.34 However, the
effect appeared not to be entirely adverse, as arguably, those elite affiliations which have successfully become very
rich seemed to have repaid in both the variety of research and unmistakably in its quality. The prominent role of
elite universities is often said to have a wider impact in driving science forward.16, 35 Here, this is demonstrated by
the fact that other well-funded places, which might have less capacity to expand, have consistently benefited from
their association with the elites through the rich core. This agrees with previous claims on the importance of elite
universities in facilitating multi-partner collaborations.16
Here, we revealed how collaboration networks constantly undergo adaptive organisation in response to funding,
resulting in an evident shift in network configuration across different scales. These shifts in collaboration patterns
may potentially mean a change in the nature of these partnerships, altering their strengths (e.g. frequency and
financial value). This line of research remains unexplored, and hence, a comprehensive study on the weighted version
of these networks will provide a leap in understanding the magnitude of these variations in patterns. Furthermore,
studying into other attributes that may also covary with funding, such as the degree of interdisciplinary research, will
allow us to gain an insight into how mechanisms36, 37 for formulating partnerships have evolved, as the impact of
funding is highly likely to be multidimensional.
Funding is an essential part of research as it provides the very much sought after resources to support related
activities. Applying for funding is highly competitive38 as suggested by the low average success rate, and in many
countries the economic recession observed in recent years has led to considerable pressure on the research budget.
A better understanding on successful project formations, therefore, provides an insight into how to thrive in such
challenging landscape.
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Methods
Dataset - EPSRC Grants on the Web (GoW)
The EPSRC, formerly the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC), was created in 1981 to reflect the
increased emphasis on engineering research. The dataset was collected from the EPSRC GoW system39 which,
at the time of data collection, contained a total of 43,193 projects awarded between 1985 and 2013 (only grants
starting prior to 1st Oct 2013 were available). For each project, we recorded the title and the total value, the Principal
Investigator (PI), any Co–investigator(s) (CIs) and/or other investigator(s) (OIs), the start and end dates, affiliation(s)
of the investigators(s), and the associated research area(s). Funding was considered to be awarded to the PI and
the affiliation of the PI. Information on how the overall funding of a given grant was divided among the rest of the
investigators (and their affiliations) was not made available.
Adjustment to monetary values
As the period of study spans over three decades, the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) with respect to 2005, provided by
the Office for National Statistics,40 has been applied to adjust the figures so that the monetary values of grants were
made comparable across the whole period of study. This index was chosen as the costing associated with a grant is
often originated from salaries, travel and equipment (including consumables), and their changes in value over time
are well captured by the CPI.
Network construction
Two types of networks were constructed based on the EPSRC GoW. Firstly, we referred to a project partnership
between a PI and a collaborator (a CI or an OI) as an edge and the resultant network was referred to as the
investigator network. Grants consisted of only one investigator, i.e. only the PI, have been excluded from the network
construction. Similarly, we referred to a project partnership between the affiliations of a PI and a collaborator (a CI
or an OI) as an edge and obtained the affiliation network. In both cases, we constructed a network for each year
by referring to all the active projects and in this case an edge would be present for the duration of a project. For
example, if a project started and ended in 1990 and 1993, the associated edges would be present between 1990 and
1993 inclusively. All networks were studied as undirected and unweighted graphs.
Effective size ζi
To examine the degree of brokerage of an affiliation we focused on the presence of structural holes18 in the network:
a node acts as an information broker when it bridges otherwise disjoint neighbours. We assessed the level of
brokerage of a node i by calculating its normalised effective size as: ζi = 1− ki−1ki Ci ,18, 19 where ki is the degree
of the node and Ci is its clustering coefficient. ζi ranges between 0 and 1. A value of 0 denotes a fully connected
local network, implying a fully cohesive clique; while a value of 1 reflects a centralised local network with a star
configuration which means the highest level of brokerage.
The rich-club phenomenon and the rich core
To detect the presence of a rich-club phenomenon we first ranked the network nodes in descending order of their
degree, k. Starting with the group of nodes with the highest degree, we calculated for each value of k the quantity
φ(k) = 2E(k)k(k−1) , where E(k) is the number of edges among nodes with a degree ≥ k.20 To determine φnorm(k), we
compared φ(k) of the empirical network to that obtained from an ensemble of random graphs. Specifically, for
a given empirical network, we constructed 1000 random graphs with the same degree sequence as the empirical
network and obtained φrand(k) by averaging over the ensemble of networks. Finally, φnorm(k) =
φ(k)
φrand(k)
.21
Once we have established that high degree affiliations exhibited a rich-club phenomenon, we characterised the
membership of the club in each year by applying a core profiling method.22 We ranked the importance of the nodes
in descending order of their degree, such that the node with the highest degree is ranked first and so on. For a given
node, we divided its links into two groups: those with nodes of a higher rank and those with a lower rank. More
formally, a node with a rank r has degree kr; the number of links it shares with nodes of a higher rank is k+r and the
number of links with nodes of a lower rank is kr− k+r . Starting from the node with the highest rank, as r increases
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the number of links k+r that node r shares with nodes of a higher rank fluctuates. There will be a node r
∗ where k+r
has reached its maximum, and from that node onwards k+r is always less than k
+
r∗ . This change in the connectivity
among the highly ranked nodes defines the boundary of the rich core: the nodes with a rank less than or equal to r∗
are the core and the rest belong to the periphery.22
Research performance
We evaluated the research performance of an affiliation by its relative citation score23 and the h-index24, 25 in 2013.
The former accounts for the total number of citations per faculty member in an affiliation, and is considered as
a measure of the volume of research (i.e. quantity). The latter takes into consideration the citations of the best
papers, and is considered as a measure of the depth of research (i.e. quality). The scores for individual affiliations
were obtained from the QS World University Rankings41 and they were calculated based on bibliometric data on
Scopus.42 Both quantities were normalised to take values in the range [0,100]. Scores were available in a range of
disciplines and only subject areas related to the Engineering and Physical Sciences domains were selected, including
Chemistry, Computer Science and Information Systems, Engineering (Chemical, Civil and Structural, Electrical and
Electronic, and Mechanical), Materials Sciences, Mathematics and Physics. Individual subject citation scores and
h-indexes of a given affiliation were averaged and used as a measure of performance. Only Imperial, Cambridge,
Manchester, Oxford, UCL and Edinburgh have scored in all areas.
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Figure S1. Patterns between grants and principle investigators. (a). The average number of investigators and
associated affiliations generally increased over time. (b) The number of investigators in a grant (include all PIs, CIs
and OIs) and its frequency. (c) Most PIs had only one successful grant and the number of grants a PI received
declined sharply; for example, there were less than 10 PIs who have managed to obtain more than 20 grants. (d) The
number of PIs against the number of active years which is defined as the sojourn time between the first and last
recorded grants of a given PI. (e) The average number of grants obtained by a PI generally increased with his/her
career length.
About half of the grants (21954 to be precise) were associated with one or more CIs and/or OIs. Both the
average numbers of investigators and affiliations increased over time (Fig. S1a). While a grant could have over 40
investigators, by large, the majority of grants consisted of a small number of investigators (Fig. S1b). The number of
grants awarded to a PI decreased exponentially (Fig. S1c). We defined an active period of a PI as the number of
years between his/her first and last recorded grants. Fig. S1d shows a gentle decline on the number of PIs as the
number of active year increased. We observed a direct correction between the length of active research period and
the number of grants one obtained (Fig. S1e).
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Figure S2. Network properties of the investigator network. (a). The number of nodes and edges and the size
of the giant component (GC) covaried with the total funding awarded by the EPSRC of a given year. (b). The
number of nodes and edges in the investigator network over time. (c). The number of components in the network
and the size of the giant component. (d). The giant component grew over time; the normalised size of the GC is
obtained by dividing the size of the giant component by the total number of nodes. (e). The average degree
remained very low throughout the period of study.
In the network of investigators, the network size in terms of both number of investigators and collaborations
correlated with funding (Fig. S2a). Though, we observed a threshold at about £500 million in which network growth
slowed down with further increase in funding. The total funding reached over this threshold in 2000 (Fig. S2b); and
in fact, the network reduced in size when there was a noticeable rise in funding in 2009. Similarly, an increased
funding also resulted in a larger giant component in the network, implying better interconnectivity among different
local groups of investigators (Fig. S2c and d); though the overall connectivity of the network remained sparse as the
average degree was low and variable (Fig. S2e).
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Figure S3. Network properties of the affiliation network. (a). The number of nodes and edges and the size of
the giant component (GC) covaried with the total funding. (b). The number of nodes and edges in the affiliation
network over time. (c). The number of components in the network and the size of the giant component. (d). The
network has remained well connected as the size of the giant component remained equal to or very close to the size
of the network. (e). The average degree was variable.
We observed similar covariance between funding and network size (Fig. S3a) in the network of affiliations.
Again, the network shrank in size as a result of the sharp increase in funding in 2009 (Fig. S3b); this provides another
evidence on heterogeneous distribution of funding. In contrast to the investigator network, the affiliation network
was well connected with very few disjoint components (Fig. S3c and d). The average degree was significantly higher
than that of the investigator network, and of much higher level of variability (Fig. S3e).
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Figure S4. Collaboration patterns of the top 20 funded affiliations covaried with funding. This figure shows
the effective size and awarded funding of the top 20 funded affiliations which is an extension of Fig. 2 (panel (b) and
(e)) in the main paper, in which only results of Imperial and Heriot-Watt are shown. (a-b) Brokerage among the top
10 affiliations clearly increased with the total funding. Other less well funded affiliations showed a less distinct trend
(c) while most affiliations in the last quantile decreased in brokerage as the funding increased (d). (e-h) Funding
obtained by the top 20 affiliations continued to increase with the total funding.
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Figure S5. Funding and research performance of the rich core. This figure is the full version of Fig. 4 in the
main paper, which only shows affiliations with Ncore > 20. (a). The more an affiliation appeared in the core, the
more funding it was likely to received. Colour denotes the number of active research areas which have received a
score. Dark and light blue lines denote the mean and one standard deviation from the mean respectively. (b). Most
frequently found affiliations in the rich core; and their citation score increased with their appearance in the rich core.
(c). Similarly, the appearance in the core is indicative of an affiliation’s h-index.
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Tables
Affiliation Abbreviation Grants Total £ Ncore ζavg
Imperial College Imperial 2658 880,042,691 28 0.847
University of Cambridge Cambridge 2182 785,600,273 27 0.806
University of Manchester Manchester 2351 612,256,769 27 0.830
University of Oxford Oxford 1966 557,758,967 28 0.818
University College London UCL 1417 543,449,634 27 0.828
University of Southampton Southampton 1373 508,545,865 27 0.763
University of Sheffield Sheffield 1367 408,240,769 28 0.803
University of Nottingham Nottingham 1411 393,624,426 27 0.755
University of Edinburgh Edinburgh 1191 376,515,957 25 0.747
University of Leeds Leeds 1452 369,915,734 28 0.822
University of Bristol Bristol 1259 357,784,563 27 0.751
University of Birmingham Birmingham 1059 320,365,372 27 0.784
University of Warwick Warwick 1111 299,106,838 27 0.712
Loughborough University Loughborough 971 292,614,129 25 0.747
University of Strathclyde Strathclyde 1004 267,072,205 24 0.746
University of Glasgow Glasgow 857 247,098,481 24 0.777
University of Liverpool Liverpool 966 240,086,056 26 0.760
University of Bath Bath 992 238,851,816 27 0.675
Newcastle University Newcastle 813 222,668,660 26 0.748
Heriot-Watt University Heriot Watt 857 202,088,932 24 0.754
University of Surrey Surrey 783 200,322,051 24 0.726
Durham University Durham 776 172,691,133 25 0.684
University of St Andrews St Andrews 515 166,131,172 8 0.687
Cranfield University Cranfield 578 164,867,131 18 0.714
Queen’s University Belfast Queen’s 660 142,904,945 14 0.712
Queen Mary, Uni. of London QMUL 618 139,471,209 12 0.685
Cardiff University Cardiff 648 133,551,032 23 0.740
University of York York 611 128,477,800 16 0.703
Swansea University Swansea 488 110,663,780 7 0.735
Lancaster University Lancaster 516 107,044,160 14 0.682
Brunel University Brunel 415 91,665,418 18 0.714
King’s College London King’s 530 88,242,899 9 0.708
University of Exeter Exeter 454 86,135,975 17 0.618
University of Reading Reading 467 78,721,875 17 0.682
University of Salford Salford 470 75,592,400 18 0.770
STFC - Laboratories STFC 215 69,769,793 12 0.589
University of Leicester Leicester 382 48,127,442 1 0.585
University of Kent Kent 335 45,236,232 1 0.678
University of East Anglia E. Anglia 308 42,871,012 2 0.652
University of Hull Hull 320 41,882,084 1 0.655
University of Dundee Dundee 236 40,908,598 5 0.690
University of Bradford Bradford 287 36,219,345 1 0.737
Royal Holloway, Uni. of London R. Holloway 191 34,035,831 1 0.675
Keele University Keele 213 22,234,981 1 0.670
15/16
Affiliation Abbreviation Grants Total £ Ncore ζavg
Bangor University Bangor 193 18,407,971 1 0.582
Table S1. Members of the rich core. Affiliations were sorted in descending order of their total funding. For each
affiliation, their total number of grants (Grants) and total amount funding awarded (Total £), frequency found in the
rich core (Ncore) and yearly average effective size (ζavg) are shown. 1985 has been omitted as the network only had 8
affiliations.
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